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Steps towards 
a Theory of the 
managed Firm (tmF)
Hacia una teoría de la “Empresa Dirigida” 
(managed Firm)
1. THE POST-COASIAN PROGRAM
Notions of managing are entwined with experiencing the situation 
being managed. Managing a country is not the same as managing 
a firm; managing a family firm differs from managing a global giant.   
English language organization and management (O&M) scholars are 
presently focused on private firms rather than on countries or public 
sector agencies. But what is a private firm? Mainstream economists 
tell us their ‘theory of the firm’ is actually about firms’ market 
engagements and pricing decisions (Demsetz, 1991; Hawkins, 1973) 
and that they have no answers to Coase’s 1937 killer questions - why 
firms exist, why their boundaries are as they are, why their internal 
arrangements are as they are, and why their performance is so varied 
(Coase, 1937). Demsetz remarked that regrettably, for 30 years after 
the appearance of Coase’s paper, the ‘theory of the firm’ research 
maintained a ‘theoretical slant … that prevented an examination of 
facts pertaining to firms’ (Demsetz, 1995:1). Eventually Coase’s work 
encouraged a small group of economists into new efforts to create a 
new and more managerially relevant theory of the firm (ToF). A huge 
micro economic literature with many distinct threads has resulted - 
transaction cost theory, property rights theory, principal-agent theory, 
nexus of contracts, and so on. Williamson’s Nobel is this project’s 
shining achievement. Foss & Klein summarize the situation’s 
possibilities well (Foss & Klein, 2012).  
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executive summary 
In 1937 Ronald Coase posed several killer questions about the nature of the firm; why (a) 
do they exist, (b) are their boundaries where they are, (c) are their internal arrangements as 
they are, and (d) is their performance so varied. These questions precipitated new ‘theories 
of the firm’ - principal-agent theory, transaction cost analysis, and so on. In this paper I turn 
these questions around and into a critique of ‘rational man’ theorizing. I argue the fundamental 
nature of the firm is as a ‘managed’ context for the exercise of imagination and judgment.
resumeN del artículo
En 1937, Ronald Coase plantea varias preguntas asesinas sobre la naturaleza de la empresa, 
¿por qué (a) existen, (b) están sus fronteras donde ellas están, (c) son sus mecanismos 
internos como son, y (d) su rendimiento es tan variado. Estas preguntas dio lugar al surgimiento 
de nuevas “teorías de la empresa” - teoría principal-agente, el análisis de los costos de 
transacción, etc. En este trabajo retomo el debate de estas preguntas y una crítica de la teoría 
del “hombre racional”. Sostengo que la naturaleza fundamental de la empresa es como un 
contexto “dirigido” por el ejercicio de la imaginación y el juicio.
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Less clear are its managerial implications, either in toto or in part. One 
interpretation is that these economists made considerable progress 
towards answering Coase’s questions. If so, their findings are of great 
relevance to O&M theorists whose notions of firms and managers’ 
work are often little more than naive, for the Carnegie tradition, that 
managing is rational decision-making or mere computation, still 
dominates our literature and teaching. In which case firms are the 
managers’ (and owners’) rationally designed apparatus for economic 
goal seeking. Even if this tradition does little to inform real business 
practice it fits well with the older Weberian tradition of the firm as a 
locus of objectivity in the nature of resources and rationality in their 
disposition. But the ‘new ToF’ clearly expands the nature of 
managing beyond resource allocation to embrace, in principal-
agent theory for example, personnel incentive and monitoring 
costs. The human being as a resource that is problematic, not 
fully rational, and so needs a different mode of managing is 
brought back into an analysis that previously took Rational 
Man as axiomatic, rejecting all other modes of human action. 
Transaction cost theory is a broader discourse, somewhat 
tangled, but terms such as ‘atmosphere’, ‘fundamental 
transformation’, and ‘contractual incompleteness’ move it 
in the same direction, plus ‘real’ market characteristics are 
brought in. Likewise the property rights and nexus of contracts 
approaches bring the specifics of corporate law and the firm’s 
‘appropriation regime’ into the analysis.  
But what are the managerial implications of these 
developments? Is a new model of managing implied? More 
specifically, does the ‘new ToF’ concept of managing reach 
beyond Carnegie-style decision-making, getting beyond 
criticizing it for being ‘unrealistic’? Can the ‘new ToF’ help 
those criticizing business schools’ over-attention to rationality? So an 
alternative reading is that it is an exploration of the different notions of 
managing implied by its various threads. Not many economists look at 
it this way, of course, but they seek general theory to which rationality 
is key - otherwise what they come up with is not economics - while 
O&M writers are more open to specifics and contingencies as we 
concede managing might reflect the local culture, the entrepreneur’s 
interests, the legal context (public or private), the firm’s type and 
history, and so on. We move closer to managing as the practice of 
dealing with unique circumstances, of making something happen. 
The human being 
as a resource that 
is problematic, not 
fully rational, and 
so needs a different 
mode of managing 
is brought back 
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Rational Man as 
axiomatic, rejecting 
all other modes of 
human actionJ.c. SpENDER
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In which case the various threads of the ‘new ToF’ discussion 
probe various ways in which managing in situ differs from Carnegie 
rationalism and its image of managing in abstracto. 
2. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY
Perhaps the clearest example of the difference is principal-agent 
theory (PAT). The framing is well known. A principal wishes her 
agent to do X - but there is knowledge asymmetry between them 
that opens up the possibility of ‘opportunism’, that he acts in his own 
interest rather than in hers. How should she monitor or incentivize 
him to act in her interest rather than in his own? This is a venerable 
question to which we can find references in the Bible, Talmud, or 
Muquaddimah. In a famous 1976 paper Jensen & Meckling framed 
the problem in micro economic terms, suggesting there was a formal 
economic solution that should guide managers facing this problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Their paper created considerable 
excitement because the PAT relationship seemed to capture 
something of the firm’s essence and suggest a more realistic ToF 
- since 2007 we have heard a great deal about the ‘moral hazards’ 
of bankers’ bonuses, a PAT matter. Firms have other essences, of 
course, implied in their make-or-buy decisions, their contractual 
behavior, and their legal standing. But principal-agent theory (PAT) 
reanimated Berle & Means’s concerns about business’s power 
(Berle & Means, 1968) and grasped a tension between owners and 
managers or managers and employees that had to be managed.  
For micro economist theorists the implication of Jensen & Meckling’s 
paper was that the PAT relationship could be managed by ‘rationality 
alone’. Critics argued rationality or ‘prudence alone’ could not be 
sufficient and that human relationships could not be usefully analyzed 
in such simplistic economic terms (McCloskey, 2010; Spender, 2011). 
Rational Man is simply not the right place to begin. With suspicions 
aroused it is useful to re-examine how Jensen & Meckling framed their 
paper, given it is long and somewhat uneven. One notable feature 
is their assertion that there can be a single period solution (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976:351). Another is their appeal to data generated in 
‘efficient’ markets (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:345). The latter claim is 
especially curious for in efficient markets all actors are principals and 
there are no agents. In short the authors’ specification actually denied 
the phenomenon their analysis addressed.  
If we go back to the older economic literature on PAT, in Books 4 
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and 5 of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, for instance, we see the 
management problems of divergent knowledge and interests cannot 
ever be fully resolved without one or other party being subordinated to 
or voluntarily adopting the knowledge and interests of the other. Absent 
this change of mind (and heart) effective management of a PAT situation 
relies on establishing some workable middle ground, most probably 
through the actors’ mutual learning over several periods of interaction; 
Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat game solution – punish-forgive or win-stay, 
lose-switch - being one formal statement of this process2. Note the 
crucial inclusion of time, excised in single period solutions. In the O&M 
literature we highlight the importance of trust, something that takes time 
to develop, that cannot be purchased in a spot market. (While character 
references can be purchased, as with credit scores, others for whom 
history mattered created them). Non-Jensen & Meckling approaches 
to PAT show trust-creation becomes an objective in and of itself, so 
clarifying the managerial implications of this thread of the post-Coasian 
program (White, 1991). Instead of being told to calculate the minimum 
costs of incentive, oversight, and loss, managers are advised to ‘work 
together - cautiously’ – like porcupines.
To help generalize from this example, it is useful to spell out the 
PAT problem the manager is addressing. Its triggers are the parties’ 
divergent interests and knowledge, a huge shift of emphasis from the 
neoclassical presuppositions of the Carnegie approach. Instead of all 
actors standing parri passu in a universe of objective fact, wherein 
knowledge is freely available and certain, when rational analysis 
seems the best way to go, the ‘new ToF’ analysis presumes human 
actors differ and cannot be considered mere atomic ‘Rational Men’. 
Heterogeneity enters. In a limited practical way trust can overcome 
the opportunistic risks of the actors’ differences, bringing them into an 
ongoing multi-period social relation. Managing is then not simply about 
optimizing the allocation of resources that can be measured rationally 
and objectively, but includes getting to grips with their differences and 
relations. Differences only arise, of course, because we humans never 
have full knowledge of our situation or that of others, because we are 
never complete isolates and always have social relations. The ‘new 
ToF’ allows that bounded rationality and uncertainty are endemic in 
social and economic matters (Spender, 2013).  
In the background looms the notion that managing is about using 
judgment to define an incompletely known and maybe unknowable 
socio-economic-political situation and, second, that it involves the J.c. SpENDER
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practice of shaping others’ knowledge of and attitudes towards the 
situation as management have specified it. We quickly disappear 
down a rabbit-hole into the complex world of ‘real managerial 
practice’, and few economists wish to abandon the crutch of 
rationality and follow. But the general point is that each of the 
various threads of the ‘new ToF’ hinges on a posited imperfection 
that, displacing the analysis from the neoclassical framing, has to be 
managed with more than ‘rationality alone’ (Foss, 2002). In PAT the 
displacing imperfection is the asymmetry of the actors’ interest and 
knowledge. Transaction cost analysis (TCA) is more complicated, 
embracing PAT as well as other imperfections, including that manifest 
as the firm’s ability to produce at a price less than the market price, or 
not.  In the property rights approaches the imperfection is that which 
leads to individuals and firms owning what others do not, the puzzle 
of heterogeneous resource acquisition and distribution tackled in 
‘strategic factor markets’ and explaining Ricardian rent-streams. In 
the nexus of contracts literature the imperfections revolve around 
whatever makes spot contracts unworkable and a consideration of 
time, execution, and incomplete contracts necessary.
3. TAKING IMPERFECTION / UNCERTAINTY SERIOUSLY
Imperfections appear as the surprises the ‘real’ world holds in store 
for those who act purposively and intentionally within it - ‘mindfully’ or 
‘heedfully’ as Weick might say (Weick, 1995). Being unanticipated, 
surprise is an empirical concept lying beyond what was anticipated, 
beyond cognition and in the world of practice. Though analysis 
sometimes reveals unexpected implications of one’s assumptions, 
surprise follows action rather than analysis. Those thinking through 
well-structured theoretical discourse meet only deductions or errors.   
Surprises presume something practical - a statement, data, or 
evidence - that lies beyond that discourse, something mediated by 
the action that follows expectation3.  
Business provides many surprises for many kinds of imperfection 
arise in real situations. It is replete with uncertainties, unknown-
unknowns, and dots not connected. Each imperfection, when 
identified, indicates a managerial task that lies beyond their rational 
computational duties in the Carnegie model. Given the manager’s 
eventual choice cannot be evaluated objectively it must be treated 
as a matter of judgment, an act of managerial (entrepreneurial) 
imagination and agency even when facts play a significant part in StEpS toWARDS A tHEoRy oF tHE mANAgED FIRm (tmF)
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limiting the manager’s strategic options (Spender, 1989). For example 
there may be several routes between locations A and B. Not knowing 
the circumstances prevailing on these routes - such as road works 
or accidents - choosing becomes a matter of judgment. At the same 
time the possible options are limited by the presence or absence of 
roads, a matter of contextual fact and by the capabilities and reliability 
of the actor’s means of transportation. The manager’s judgment 
or choice’s quality is only revealed ex post, in the outcome of its 
implementation - were you caught in the traffic jam or not? In real 
world situations chance and uncertainty invariably intervene between 
ex ante analysis and ex post experience. As we focus on the latter we 
shift the analysis of managing from the abstractions of theorizing that 
presumes full knowledge and computability and into the imperfect 
world of practice in which business is done. Economic value is only 
lost or gained here for an economy is a historically institutionalized 
social practice, neither an abstract concept nor an inanimate object.  
While this shift does not resolve Coase’s questions directly it does 
suggest it is more productive to address them in a practical milieu, 
implying that firms are creatures of practice not theory and that there 
may be no general answers for absent a general theory of market, 
organizational, or personal imperfection the manager’s challenges 
will be situationally and historically specific and only discovered 
empirically. Crucially, managers have to select which imperfections 
to attend to and which to ignore. Time and history matter, as do 
specifics. The practices that coalesce into a real economy are 
heterogeneous and discontinuous rather than aspects of a rational 
and homogenous continuum, as neoclassical economics presumes. 
Frank Knight famously suggested that profit arose only from engaging 
a real economy’s uncertainties, not as a matter of theory, nor from 
comparative efficiencies in production, and Coase reiterated this 
(Jacobsen, 2008; Knight, 1921). There was no ‘theory of profit’ and, 
perhaps, no theory of the firm to be found within the neoclassical 
discourse (Knight, 1942). Inter alia, Knight and Coase argued 
that without uncertainty all gains get competed away instantly as 
markets clear, leaving no new value. The ‘new ToF’ focuses on the 
imperfections that prevent such clearing and thus to the possibility of 
added value and profit. In which case firms may arise as enterprising 
managers go beyond rational analysis and apply their judgment to 
dealing with or even creating imperfections. Firms differ from markets 
as managed situations for creating value by engaging imperfections J.c. SpENDER
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- in contrast to engaging markets that are ‘unmanaged’, wherein 
managerial judgment is irrelevant and value cannot be created.  
But removal of the ‘invisible hand’ that manages markets threatens 
chaos, a free-for-all, the very notion of an economy. The challenge for 
the ’new ToF’ economists introducing imperfection is to explain how 
economic order might then arise without the visible hand of central 
economic management, to analyze imperfect competition’s macro 
economic consequences (Dixon & Rankin, 1995). One formulation 
is to retain the invisible hand at one remove from firms’ competitive 
activity, to presume markets equilibrate as Kirznerian entrepreneurs 
help re-stabilize markets disturbed by Schumpeterian ‘creative 
destruction’ (e.g. Langlois, 2003, 2007). Disturbed markets may well 
provide entrepreneurs with opportunities to create new value in the 
equilibration process, perhaps bringing forth the value uncovered by 
creative destruction - new buildings as slums are cleared, new ideas 
as old ones are consigned to the ashcan of history. 
4. TAKING HETEROGENEITY SERIOUSLY
The ‘new ToF’ program pays little attention to an earlier group 
of ‘tween-war economists’ who pursued the ‘theory of the firm’ 
as they pondered imperfect markets, imperfect competition, 
and their political-economic implications - a group that included 
Chamberlin, Robertson, Austin and Joan Robinson, and Triffin4.  
No single compelling ToF (of imperfect competition) resulted but 
the group did much to clarify the nature and impact of economic 
imperfections. Stiglitz provides a useful list: (a) learning and 
information heterogeneities and asymmetries, (b) capital market 
imperfections, and (c) product market imperfections (Stiglitz, 1989).   
It is also useful to note supply market imperfections, especially in 
labor markets where there are personal, institutional and national 
differences in education, skill, and political interest. Likewise Coase 
drew attention to the costs of learning, rejecting the neoclassical 
assumption that knowledge and information are free.  
Imperfections often lead to ‘market power’ differences that can be 
leveraged into economic rents. Given the economic and political 
concerns of the day the ‘tween-war theorists and their later IO 
brethren focused on how governments might intervene in private 
firms’ attempts to create and ‘own’ imperfections and transform into 
monopolies. Following Robertson, who saw firms as “islands of 
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious (market) cooperation, StEpS toWARDS A tHEoRy oF tHE mANAgED FIRm (tmF)
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like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk” (Robertson, 
1928:84), they stressed heterogeneity, to the point each firm could 
be considered unique and no firm’s product or service a perfect 
substitute for another’s. In which case industries are no longer 
abstractions but fuzzy historically situated socio-economic contexts 
wherein established firms and entrepreneurs impact each other’s 
fortunes even as they differ in history, goals, style, and resources.  
Heterogeneity reflects uncertainty, our inability to see how 
everything is connected to everything else. Where we find 
heterogeneity judgment is required to bring things together in an act 
of judgment and agency. Integration and coordination is necessary.   
The neoclassical approach implies rationality alone is sufficient for 
this because the things being considered are commensurate and 
the consequences of bringing them together can be calculated, 
things integrate themselves. Taking heterogeneity seriously renders 
neoclassical notions of ‘the market’ or ‘the economy’ irrelevant 
since, in practice, no such entities can be defined, bounded, or 
measured. Many analysts move towards the more readily observed 
firms and the interactions that define markets or economies as 
socio-economic institutions of inter-firm practice. Seeing firms as 
less problematic than markets Harrison White, for instance, argued 
markets are better understood as ‘netdoms’ of three types of inter-
firm interaction: grind, paradox, and crowd (White, 1981, 2002).   
The implication is that managing is about judging and choosing 
firm-level interactions, positioning managing within the discipline of 
business strategy - though White is seldom cited there.  
The post-WW2 move towards greater rigor and mathematization 
eventually pushed imperfect competition and IO economics into the 
background - whence it was famously recovered and re-deployed 
into present-day O&M strategy theorizing by Porter (Porter, 1981; 
Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). His 5-force analysis considers 
the economic actors and interactions that can threaten the focal 
firm’s rent-stream (Spender & Kraaijenbrink, 2011), interactions 
that characterize one or other of White’s netdoms. The firm’s nature 
as an economic actor is taken for granted. Managing is then the 
strategic process of locating and directing the firm’s interactions 
over successive time-periods within an imperfectly comprehended 
netdom of inter-firm power and resource differentials.
But once admitted into the analysis, heterogeneity cannot easily 
be stopped for it equally problematizes the notion of the firm as a J.c. SpENDER
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production function. The ‘new ToF’ differs from the earlier theorizing 
about imperfect competition because it breaks open the ‘black box’, 
something the earlier writers had not done so directly. The recent 
authors introduce (or re-introduce) additional heterogeneities that 
must be managed with judgment because the things to be managed 
are incommensurable. Adam Smith’s ToF - the entrepreneurial 
practice of bringing specific quantities of land, labor and capital 
together - only has the potential to create new value because these 
three factors of production are incommensurable and differ in ways 
theory has not yet clarified. The integration and coordination process 
are synthetic, for the firm arises from the entrepreneurial judgments 
that generate the contracts that bring the resources together 
into specific economic practice. Thus the ‘new ToF’ embraces 
incommensurable resources (nexus of contracts), incommensurable 
people (PAT), and the incommensurabilities between different firms’ 
knowledge and skill as they interact across markets (TCA). These 
heterogeneities and uncertainties are resolved by the application 
of entrepreneurial judgment. The argument can be extended and 
the nature of managerial judgment further clarified by showing that 
business uncertainties are of several distinct types - ignorance 
and indeterminacy as well as incommensurability (Spender, 1989, 
2014) - and that human knowledge falls correspondingly into three 
categories; data, meaning, and practice (Spender, 2007).
5. THE FINAL BLOW 
Taking Knightian uncertainty seriously ultimately collapses the 
rationalist notions of economy, market, and firm. But its rampage 
cannot be stopped there either. It is common to see firms as 
‘bundles of resources’, where these include the factors of production 
(inputs, including knowledge) and consumption (such as customer 
loyalty and their willingness to pay over the market price). The 
puzzle is to see where people then fit in, in spite of the ready way 
we refer to people as ‘a crucial resource’. What we mean, of course, 
is their knowledge, what they know and do. This leads the analysis 
away from market-based economic definitions of resources, in 
terms of cost or market value, and into deeper waters. Whenever 
the firm is considered a rationally designed purposive apparatus 
the meanings of its resources are grounded in its goals. Power 
stations need and value fuel, advertising agencies need and value 
copy editors, power stations do not value copy editors or vice versa. StEpS toWARDS A tHEoRy oF tHE mANAgED FIRm (tmF)
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | cUARto tRImEStRE 2013 | ISSN: 1698-5117
62
Penrose stuck the final blow to rationalist notions of resource with 
her distinction between the firm’s resources and the services they 
render (Foss, 1999; Jacobsen, 2013; Spender, 1999). This set up a 
third and very different definition of resource (source of value) and 
opened up a view of managing that has little to do with the Carnegie 
view, expanded as that was by the work of Simon, March, and the 
other creators of the behavioral theory of the firm.  
Three points about the Penrosian view of managing; first, the value 
of a resource is clearly specific to the firm’s capacity to transform it 
into value-adding practice. Second, its value is indeterminate until 
the firm comes into existence as a practical entity. Third, it follows 
management’s primary task is to create the firm that can create 
this transformation, not merely to dispose its resources optimally.   
Resources cannot be understood until the firm has been created. But 
what is the firm, and what does it mean to speak of its being created? 
The fatal flaw of analyses that take the nature of the firm for granted - 
as we have no problem saying IBM or Iberia ‘exist’ - is that this leads 
us to miss management’s most fundamental task, creating these 
firms. From the Penrosian point of view the challenge managers 
face is less that of directing their firm towards its chosen goals (the 
old notion of strategy) or establishing, protecting or maximizing its 
rent-streams (the post-Porter notion of strategy) but creating it in 
the first place. She highlighted the management team’s ongoing 
constructive process, not a decision. Presuming that uncertainties 
lie at the core of the firm’s nature is then doubly challenging for 
how can uncertainties identified be drawn into an analysis of the 
management’s firm-constructing process? Penrose did not open up 
this ‘black box’ and so left Coase’s questions unanswered.
Opening it up is the final step towards the firm as a managed 
process, undetermined by any ‘objective’ considerations that lie 
beyond the managerial team’s judgments, even as those might be 
‘facts’ that limit the team’s options. So long as their choices are not 
fully determined or determinable, in which case there would be no 
possibility of profit, such facts can be treated as constraints to their 
judgment, things to be brought into mind. The interplay of uncertainty 
and imperfection is illuminating. Stiglitz’s summary shows the IO 
literature presumes imperfections arise from tangible differences 
in property, associated with Ricardian rents, or differences in 
knowledge. The implication of Penrose’s problematizing the 
traditional notion of resource is that both constraint and imperfection J.c. SpENDER
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are seen to emerge from differences in specific people’s learning, 
and all ultimately collapse into Stiglitz’s first category.  
Learning is a mystery, of course; we have no general theory of human 
learning just as we have no general theory of human knowledge. 
Epistemology explores the contrasts between our limited views, not 
Truth. So instead of focusing on managing learning the theory of the 
managed firm can only begin with what has been learned – what 
appears in place of uncertainty as a result of an act of individual 
imagination. But what is the nature or meaning of this knowledge? 
Instead of the rationalist positivist notion that all knowledge is about 
a coherent and knowable reality beyond our minds (that we can only 
learn about Nature), Penrose turns towards the phenomenological 
notion that learning is a process of creating (finding, defining) the 
human self, which amounts to what we know and can do in the 
situations in which we find ourselves.  In the economic milieu this 
proficient self is the ‘entrepreneurial idea’. There is no explaining the 
idea’s genesis, how Edison was able to ‘come up with’ the phonograph 
or Apple to ‘come up with’ the iPad. Creation and innovation may well 
be supported by ensuring that there are no factual constraints standing 
in way of the ideation process (that there are sufficient resources, 
skills, information and so on) but this is not ‘managing innovation’ 
because there is no theory of how support conduces it.
6. FINALLY - THE MANAGED FIRM (TMF) 
At this point we see taking uncertainty seriously problematizes all 
the classical notions of economy, market, firm, and resource - and 
managing. What more can be said? The rationalist jinni departs 
with a pouf, leaving a whiff of sulfur, and we face the mystery of 
human imagination and judgment. If the firm, profit, and economic 
activity, to say nothing of entrepreneurship and economic growth, 
are about imaginative engagement with the practical uncertainties 
of our situation, we can focus our attention on the gap between the 
entrepreneurial idea and its manifestation as the firm. As a trader 
and arbitrageur Cantillon focused on the entrepreneurial idea 
(Tarascio, 1985). Jean-Baptiste Say, in contrast, focused on the 
creation of the firm as a means to bring the idea into the economy 
(Long, 1983; Thornton, 2007). Whence and how the entrepreneurial 
idea arrives is not analyzable; how to transform it into a value-
creating netdom is. The rationalist take on this is ‘design’. But if the 
firm can be designed logically it cannot generate economic value; it StEpS toWARDS A tHEoRy oF tHE mANAgED FIRm (tmF)
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is no more than an apparatus to achieve known goals using known 
resources - and this fails under Knightian uncertainty.  
What can be said about how economic value is created? Just as Knight 
and Coase intuited value comes from engaging the uncertainties of 
human practice so Adam Smith intuited value comes from successfully 
engaging the ‘division of labor’, from exploiting human specialization 
and the firm-specific learning generated. Cantillon-style entrepreneurs 
need no help while Say-style entrepreneurs clearly do. In which case 
the firm is a socially and legally legitimated instrument contrived to 
compensate for the Say-ian entrepreneur’s shortcomings by drawing 
others with appropriate judgment into enacting the entrepreneurial 
idea. The continuing growth of the private sector and of private 
firms reflects the expanding uncertainties the modern economy 
engages successfully, many arising from increased consumption and 
raised standards of living, many from science and technology and 
the increasingly sophisticated products and services we desire to 
consume (McCloskey, 2006, 2010).
The part of the value-creating firm that can be managed is not idea 
generation, on which we must be silent. Rather we can discuss the 
process of leveraging the idea that ‘arrives’ into a netdom, what many 
call the firm’s business model (BM). Post-Penrose resources can only 
be understood through the prism of the BM, which is neither a design 
nor a bundle of resources. Its essence is knowledge; not simply the 
entrepreneurial idea but knowledge of how this shapes, constrains, 
and is transformed into practice. Penrose moved beyond ‘factual’ 
positivistic knowledge to include what we now call ‘tacit’ knowledge 
of experience (Penrose, 1959:53). As we know from Polanyi’s quip 
‘we know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi, 1967:4) tacit knowledge 
cannot be made explicit, written down as a logical statement. When 
a business model (always unique) synthesizes both explicit and tacit 
knowledge, it cannot be merely about ‘reality’ in the positivist sense, 
nor be readily explicated. Rather it is about how we humans know in 
ways that shape our actions, what we can make happen. Meaning 
it is an idiosyncratic language or ‘jargon’ created to draw others into 
actualizing the entrepreneurial idea. It is more poem than blueprint.  
Thus the BM differs from a formula or a logical design as natural 
language differs from formal language (such as mathematics). 
It is an artistic artifact; the product of what is perhaps a capitalist 
democracy’s most important art form. The business model that draws 
in the judgments of others is a language, so the core managerial skills J.c. SpENDER
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required to construct and implement the BM are rhetorical. The core of 
managing is persuasive use of natural language, managerial oratory 
- no surprise to anyone who has managed or been managed, only to 
those committed to the aridities of the rationalist program. Hence the 
post-Coasian program’s most fundamental characteristic is its shift 
from a positivistic discourse of objectivity and rationality into a poetry 
of economic action, subjectivity, and judgment, a shift that parallels 
the philosophical move to natural language shaped by ‘Continental 
philosophers’ like Wittgenstein, Habermas, and Heidegger (Critchley, 
2001; Stainton, 2000). The TMF puts judgment and talk at its core, 
rejecting the rationalist computational paradigm that still dominates 
our literature and puts data and analysis at its core.
7. CONCLUSION 
Knight’s conjecture about the relationship between uncertainty and 
profit opened up - or recovered - a way to think about the nature of the 
private firm. Penrose, among others, showed this made it possible to 
discuss managerial judgment, its growth, and its relationship to value-
creation and firm growth. Her first ‘law’ is that the firm cannot grow 
faster than the management team’s knowledge (Penrose, 1959:44). 
But her more fundamental contribution was to destabilize the classical 
notion of resource. This helps us present management analysis in two 
complementary epistemological and methodological spheres - one 
positivistic (our discipline’s dominant paradigm), the other linguistic 
and constructive (still an outlier). Useful as the first might be we can 
only discuss value-creation in the second.  
The practical answers to Coase’s questions become visible 
- judgment. Firms exist because they are legally and socially 
legitimated vehicles for engaging socio-economic uncertainties 
with entrepreneurial judgment – in the pursuit of private gain. 
Their boundaries are where they are as matters of judgment – 
individual and socio-legal. Their internal arrangements are likewise 
matters of judgment. There are no general theories that can relieve 
managers of their place and responsibility to make choices, and 
our discipline’s project to develop them is profoundly flawed. Firms’ 
performance varies just as each human’s does when we are judged 
in a social and ethical context. Each firm is likewise unique in its 
socio-historical situation and the uncertainties it engages. But firm 
performance also varies because the managerial judgments applied 
to bridge between the entrepreneurial idea and the BM are so StEpS toWARDS A tHEoRy oF tHE mANAgED FIRm (tmF)
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varied. We can get to practicalities of the TMF, the uncertainties 
engaged and the managerial judgments applied, by analyzing the 
BM as a local natural language created to draw in the judgments of 
those complementing the entrepreneur’s (Spender, 2014).
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